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25 April 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON LATIN AMERICA
(FOUO 6/79)

LATIN

AMERICA

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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

PARAGUAY'S OPTIONS IN PARANA TRIANGLE DISCUSSED

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 19 Feb 79 pp 6-7

[Article by Estela Araujo]

[Text] From the geopolitical viewpoint Paraguay has three possibilities which mark its relation with the countries making up the La Plata River Basin:

The first, of historic origin, can be expressed in Paraguay's close relationship as a member of the Hispano-American colonies of the La Plata River. The real dismemberment of the viceroyalty began at the time of its creation; however, it was subject to a delayed measure adopted in 1777.

This was when Spain thought it necessary to oppose the Portuguese Empire, since, shortly before, following the lines of Portuguese interest, it had put an end to the strategic Jesuit settlements, which had colonized that area from 1609 to 1767.

The administration of the great Paraguayan province, separated from the beginning from that of Buenos Aires, was dependent on the viceroyalty of Peru only to end up (in 1777) belonging to the viceroyalty of the La Plata River.

For that reason, Paraguay felt itself intimately linked to the temporal power of the Jesuits in America. Paraguay, the heart of native America, felt itself rooted in the establishment of missions.

Julia Velilla Laconich de Arellaga (Paraguayan geopolitical expert) says:

"When the conquistadors, crossing over the Andes, arrived at Potosi, the advance of the La Plata River Spanish became a retrocession. Although thwarted and disillusioned, they seized the city of Asuncion to use as a base and began the great task of colonizing and settling these areas dotting the immense perimeter of the Provincia Gigante de las Indias with cities.

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"As this province lacked metals, Spain did not consider it very important. The only possible and direct communication route between Paraguay and Alto Peru Province--via Chiquitos and Santa Cruz--and the most suitable and economical for the export of minerals from the districts of Charcas and Potosi--the route of the Guaranis and surely that which they followed from Tiahuanacu--was abandoned. Broad geographical areas were thus converted into no man's land as though inviting the Portuguese advance. Hernandarias, who longed to unite these three geographical areas which now constitute URUPABOL [Uruguay-Paraguay-Bolivia], stressed the negative aspect of dividing the province (Buenos Aires and Paraguay), if the three settlements he suggested were not carried out to completion: a city in Monte Ovidio, now Montevideo; another on the Uruguay River; and a third between Asuncion and Charcas.


"Vera Province remained abandoned, its principal port of that time now being known as Paranagua (Brazil), and this region, known fundamentally, strategically and economically as the Provincia Gigante del Paraguay, was the first piece of the mother country to be absorbed by the Brazilian Empire.

"The policy of Buenos Aires, in violation of Argentine interests and those of other provinces of the viceroyalty, has no explanation and even less justification."

The protagonists of Buenos Aires, like all others, committed tactical and profound errors, but it is easy, from the vantage point of the 20th century, to understand the difficulties and desperation of the Men of May. Expeditions aimed at unifying the viceroyalty (like that of Gen Manuel Belgrano to Paraguay) did not obtain the expected result. A skilled economist, Belgrano could not fail to see Paraguay's importance in the overall La Plata picture. The short duration of the viceroyalty had not succeeded in creating stronger ties among its constituents. The more meaningful and stronger port interests had gained momentum much more quickly.

It was the Spanish court's shortsightedness which caused Paraguay to lose with the missions a territory which included an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean in what is now southern Brazil.

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Key:

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In view of Paraguay's geostrategic landlocked position, similar to that of Bolivia, various gateways are possible. The Paraguayan option will determine whether it is a gateway to open or--a Brazilian variation--to close.

Paraguay, the route to continuous progress, is the true way to the sea. That is why the Guaraní landlocked position is not insurmountable. Its Paraguay-Parana rivers provide for the natural movement of the economy, yesterday as today. Highways are an artificial form of communication which Brazil established to absorb the wealth and move products via the ports of Paranaguá and Rio Grande.

The La Plata River provides this natural waterway. As the rivers take on their proper role, the viceroyalty's waterway plan will again come into being.

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This plan will undoubtedly lead to a rapprochement between Paraguay and Argentina. The Yacireta and Corpus projects, producing power and improving navigation in Parana, together with the Middle Parana project, are making it possible to realize that rapprochement, which has not or could not occur at any other time.

The second alternative is one which definitely makes Paraguay dependent upon Brazil. It consists of three points:

- a) Cross-country highways. Highways Brazil 277, which connects Asuncion with Paranagua, and the Trans Chaco, which crosses Paraguayan and Bolivian Chaco, connect Brazil and Bolivia by crossing through Paraguayan territory.
- b) The Itaipu dam is a source of power and foreign currency. It involves a decision which Paraguay must make as to how to use that power to serve as a basis for development which may or may not be dependent upon Brazil.
- c) Joining the La Plata River Basin with that of the Amazon River across Paraguayan territory. Just as the Pacific coast is the outlet for Bolivia's landlocked position, opening the way to the Amazon River Basin makes Paraguay emerge as the obligatory passage, the communication route from the Caribbean republics (Venezuela and Colombia) to the La Plata republics (Argentina and Uruguay). Paraguay would become a valid connecting link between the Hispanic nations of the two extremes of South America.

At the same time it would enter the circle of the countries of the Amazon River Basin. Paraguay would have to count on binational action with Brazil to carry out the necessary projects involved in connecting the two basins.

Moreover, that project involving waterways from on high and in Brazilian territory is (in accordance with what Paraguay has been maintaining up to now) entirely within Brazil's interest.

The third perspective Paraguay has is, as always, an intermediate position. It is for Paraguay to disregard the two biggest powers of the La Plata River Basin and reunite the three smallest: URUPABOL.

On 20 June 1963 Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia signed a document whose basic proposal was that the tripartite group would "establish and expand their commercial ties and effect a gradual interdependence of their economies."

In referring specifically to URUPABOL, Laconich de Arellaga states:

"The countries of the river basin may fail to use various products found in this or that subregion, but, later, they will not be able to ignore the oil, iron and gas of the Bolivian deposits; and still less will they be able to fail to use Paraguay's hydroelectrical power.

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"Mutum's iron ore is essential and useful, so long as it does not become the monopoly of any particular country. We have the right to obtain it directly from the producer. A Paraguayan-Bolivian association would make it possible to use the iron and hydroelectricity in blast furnaces and it could then be taken to a free port by Bolivia in Bahia Negra.

"We stress Bahia Negra not through any chauvinistic spirit but through one which is in the general American interest and realistic, since it is the only suitable port in the area. Puerto Busch, which would be the logical place from which to ship the iron production, is not a suitable port and could be made adequate only through heavy investments, which do not appear possible at the present time. Taking the iron overland by highway to Puerto Suarez would involve greater and unnecessary expenditures, which would add to the costs and preclude the possibility of using Paraguay's hydroelectric power. Moreover, Puerto Suarez permits only one ship at a time to pass through the Tamengo Canal.

"Conveying the ore from Mutum to Bahia Negra would be relatively easy and economical."

The Paraguayan-Bolivian rivalry, inherited from the Chaco War (1932-1935, the last war on the American subcontinent), would thus find itself changed through a policy which, using power coming from binational power plants with Argentina or Brazil, would provide for producing Mutum iron ore in an initial process (Bolivian sector), convey it via the Parana River (Argentine sector) and unload it at the Uruguayan port of Rocha. Although positive for the three countries, this plan is not realistic. Therefore, URUPABOL is stagnating. The three countries need what Uruguayan geopolitical expert Bernardo Quagliotti de Bellis calls the "Parana Corridor," which must undoubtedly be made a part of this plan, if it is to succeed.

In addition to the definite realization this year of the Yacireta project and the extremely difficult execution of the Corpus and Itaipu projects, Paraguay will come up with a new strategy. The three routes it can pursue, generally stated, are as follows: a rapprochement with Argentina, a rapprochement with Brazil or support by URUPABOL with a feeling of integration which, without foreign aid, represents a very slow rate of development for three countries of different characteristics.

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ARGENTINA

'LA OPINION' INTERVIEWS CONCAP DIRECTOR

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 26 Mar 79 p 7

[Interview with Gen Mariano de Nevares, director of the National Rio de la Plata Basin Commission, by Estela Araujo]

[Text] The Itaipu-Corpus issue, the visit to Brasilia by Foreign Minister Washington Pastor, the statements of the new president, Joao Baptista Figueiredo, all have kept the press interested in the Rio de la Plata Basin.

LA OPINION, in an interview with Gen Mariano de Nevares, director of the National Rio de la Plata Basin Commission, has obtained a rapid geopolitical overview of the main proposals.

Gen Nevares, cautiously enthusiastic about the problematic victory, had the following conversation in his office at the Commission (CONCAP) headquarters. The old building, which stands between the Cathedral and City Hall, provides a view from its large windows, at an angle, of a corner of the Plaza de Mayo.

The past of this building, involving city government, and its future, involving dams, will be joined together.

[Question] What is the origin of the National Rio de la Plata Commission?

[Answer] The CONCAP originated in the Rio de la Plata Treaty, signed in Brasilia in 1969. Thus, it emerged from an international commitment that, as such, is national law. The present organization, mission and set-up of the National Commission were established by Law 21,484, promulgated on 30 December, 1976.

[Question] The programs and projects in the basin almost all have a long history. Some, like Salto Grande, are already facts.

The inauguration of the dam in May signifies the kick-off of the hydroelectric energy program in that context.

What importance do you attach to that fact?

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[Answer] Salto Grande is the first binational hydroelectric plant to operate in the Rio de la Plata Basin. As such, it is anticipated that Itaipu, Yacyreta, Corpus and other plants on the Upper Bermejo, Upper Uruguay, etc., that are under construction or will be built later, will fulfill similar functions. In addition, this is a true example of international cooperation, and a full interpretation of the spirit that inspired the Rio de la Plata Basin Treaty and should prevail in the implementation of that treaty.

When it begins operation next May, it will constitute an important milestone in the process initiated in order to exploit the formidable hydric resources that are available in that basin. Its operation will also serve to contribute to an adequate supply of energy, with intensive use of the inexhaustible sources of energy and significant savings in non-renewable resources, mainly petroleum, coal and gas. Finally, it should be pointed out that its location and operation will serve to integrate the nation, and favor physical integration with Uruguay.

[Question] At a lecture in Santa Fe on the Middle Parana project, you emphasized the geopolitical importance of the dam.

Do you think that those ideas are still valid? I am referring to:

--The relevance of the policy of national "interiority."

--The unification of the northeast and the central and northwestern parts of Argentina.

--The complementing of the Rosario-Buenos Aires-La Plata central nucleus with the northern part of the country.

--The establishment of a geostrategical pivot or operational base for the culmination of national integration.

--The necessary power for the development of all of northeastern Argentina.

--The implementation of an independent national strategy that will be free from international hindrances.

--The correct geopolitical response to restrictions in the Upper Parana which cause delays and openly threaten national development.

--The possibility of neutralizing foreign pressure on northeastern Argentina.

--The establishment of a geostrategic launching pad or base for the projection of national interests beyond our borders.

--The correct response to the physical insecurity regarding the variants of the Parana, or to uncontrolled actions due to intentional errors in the Upper Basin.

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[Answer] The geopolitical reflections expressed at that time are still potentially valid, and will become tangible reality as the scheduled programs are implemented.

Much of Argentina's future depends on the optimum use of the Parana River, the stretch which goes from Confluencia to the ocean, as well as the natural or manmade connections with the Paraguay, the Bermejo, the Laguna and the marshes of the Ibera and the Uruguay.

[Question] Could you state the strategy that in your opinion should be followed from now on in terms of whether or not the Corpus Dam should be built?

[Answer] The Argentine strategy for the Rio de la Plata Basin does not end at the Upper Parana, which is just one of the manifestations of our presence and responsibilities in the basin and in the Southern Cone. At any rate, the construction of Corpus is an irrevocable national decision. Therefore, it is wrong to present the problem in terms of opposition: to build or not to build Corpus.

On the contrary, there can be disagreement about the timing of the construction. Today that depends on a satisfactory agreement with Brazil and Paraguay. It would also be wrong for our country to limit its attention to that project alone. It is imperative that we carry on the studies of the Middle Parana, improve and expand river navigation, study the use of the Upper Bermejo, in other words, carry out many projects for immediate execution, and include them in an overall plan which coordinates and optimizes the use and yield of these resources.

[Question] Are you optimistic about the overall development of hydroelectric energy within the basin?

[Answer] One cannot be pessimistic. Nature has provided us with a potential of more than 20,000 megawatts, useable as hydroelectric energy. Compare that figure with that of less than 10,000 megawatts, the installed capacity of the country, and add the other benefits to be derived from it, such as the attenuation of floods, the management of considerable flows of water, navigation, irrigation, sediment control, etc. The task is a great challenge to our imagination and capacity. Our mental attitude should commit us in the future to implement projects, instead of wasting time discussing an irremediable past.

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ARGENTINA

WRITER DEFINES COMPLEXITIES OF NUCLEAR POLICIES

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 23 Mar 79 p 11

[Article by Alfredo Becerra]

[Text] Nuclear policy is one of the most complex things in this world, because in addition to the complications of the technology itself, there are political complications, as well as strategic, industrial, financial and other considerations that defy classification. For this reason, the countries that desire to get a good grasp of the slippery world of the atom are trying to educate not only nuclear technicians, but also nuclear politicians.

The atomic world is not an island in a sea of restrictions. On the contrary, it resembles more a cooperatively owned building in which all depend on the good behavior of the others and on the services which provide electricity, potable water, communication, heating and fuel.

Anyone who thinks of nuclear matters in isolated terms will run up against the reefs before landing on the beach.

Argentina has signed inter-governmental bilateral agreements since 1960, as well as direct agreements between institutions such as the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) and its counterparts in other countries. It has also signed multilateral accords, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (which is in the process of ratification) and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is a subsidiary of the United Nations.

All this, in addition to the repeated official declarations to the effect that Argentina is pursuing only peaceful goals in the use of nuclear energy, indicates that Argentina is willing to cooperate in the international development of these new resources, as well as to share the resulting benefits.

In fact, it is considering joining the London Club, and wants the United States to sponsor its candidacy. Frankly, Argentina needs a seat on that prestigious board, which comprises the countries that export nuclear technology, because in this manner its exports (it is already exporting nuclear technology) can be sold to more and better clients overseas.

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But all these nuclear issues, as well as the conventional ones, which unite Argentina with other more or less advanced nations, should not become a thick jungle of commitments which threaten to strangle the future development of nuclear technology. The current controversy over the safeguards which should be applied to the future nuclear installations that are to be built in Argentina, lies at that precise, unattainable point where the best thing for everyone is not the best thing for anyone.

To put it succinctly, we must compromise, and we are compromising. Only the negotiators know how far each one can go. The philosophy of the safeguards seems reasonable to the extent that it tries to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The safeguards are obligations that countries take on in order to prevent transfers of nuclear technology from being diverted for non-peaceful purposes.

But there are safeguards, and there are safeguards. Obligations are one thing, and mortgages are another. There are the NPT model safeguards, which are the "total" ones enforced by the IAEA, and then there are the London Club models, which are less rigorous. They are applied to exporters who above all want to make sales. NPT stands for Non-proliferation Treaty, which has been rejected by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba, in this hemisphere, and North Korea, Vietnam, India and South Africa in other parts of the world.

The NPT safeguards contaminate all the past, present and future nuclear installations of a country, whether internal or external. They are like the poisonous carbuncles that cattle get. On the other hand, the others only contaminate what they actually touch; they are not infectious or contagious.

There can be safeguards that do not harm people.

The truth is, sooner or later the safeguards will rule the world of the atom, at least for those who were not nuclear powers in 1968, when the NPT began to take effect. The roads leading to the NPT are many and very tempting. The Tlatelolco treaty itself, so attractive because it distinguishes between nuclear explosives and peaceful explosives, has a tunnel that leads straight to the NPT. It states that 18 months after the 6 month period (for a total of 24 months) when a country has deposited its ratification instrument and the treaty has come into effect, the country must sign safeguard agreements with the IAEA.

And the IAEA has just one model of safeguards, the NPT model. Therein lies the rub.

(Tlatelolco will take effect when the Argentine ratification, the U.S. ratification of Protocol I and the signature and ratification of Cuba arrive. Argentina's ratification, as usual, will not exempt Article 28, which contains the requirements for the treaty to be effective. Argentina will ratify the agreement in the same form that Chile and Brazil did. It is not a matter of "Tlatelolcizing" before one's neighbors do.)

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But it is one thing for the safeguards to take power after many years, with a great deal of effort, and another for the power to be surrendered right here and now, free, without a shot being fired.

It is a question of honor, independence and progress in all of South America. It also concerns the promotion of industry and commerce with important countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany. There are a few billion dollars caught in the middle, waiting for the safeguards to put enough pressure on the Latin American vanguard.

The wisest thing would be to sign a truce with the safeguards, postponing for a few years the ultimate reckoning.

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ARGENTINA

ENTRE RIOS GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE IS REASSESSED

Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 24 Mar 79 p 10

[Article by Estela Araujo]

[Text] "Never have we been able to glance over the map of the Rio de la Plata without our eyes being irresistibly drawn by the surprising readiness of Entre Rios to become the richest country in the world. We are not embarrassed to say so; nature has not created a more privileged piece of land. Egypt is narrow, Holland swampy, France poorly watered. The entire country is crossed lengthwise by mountainous knives which softly cut into the countryside, stirring up rain by impaling the clouds. In the center, between two of those eminences, runs the Gualeguay, made up of forty-eight streams that subdivide the valley or basin left and right with a network of irrigation canals. Parallel to the Uruguay runs another knife, from which more than eighty currents run in nearly a straight line, about one every league. Another occurs on the opposite side, towards the Parana. The entire, stupendous country is embraced, enveloped throughout by the Parana and the Uruguay, which surround it. Entre Rios, when there are intelligent navigation laws, will be an earthly paradise, the center of power and wealth, the most compact complex of flourishing cities." ARGIROPOLIS, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento.

This text, quoted by Gustavo F. Cirigliano in a work called EL MODELO DE LA ARGENTINA FLUVIAL DE SARMIENTO ("The Sarmiento Model of Argentina's Rivers"), points out the importance of Entre Rios as a privileged province in the context of the Rio de la Plata Basin, and especially in the political program drawn up by Sarmiento and Alberdi for the turn of the century. Later, that plan was modified in terms of its geopolitical objectives, to form the so-called Project of '80.

In that plan, the Sarmiento river scheme was conceived and developed on the basis of the port of Buenos Aires, and the interior lost the fluidity of its vital trade.

Entre Rios, "the creator of cities," as Sarmiento called it, came to fulfill a geopolitical function as an intermediate territory, forming part of the Mesopotamia between Argentina and Brazil. That Mesopotamia was not integrated into national territory, but became a sort of filling between two rivers, that had to be crossed.

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Fortunately the "strategic" reasons gave rise to the bridges, which were a veritable revolution in terms of integrating the country. Col Miguel Angel Basail says in the magazine ESTRATEGIA number 36, in what he sums up as an "Argentin geopolitical appreciation":

"a) National integration, not at a sufficient level yet, is an important factor in Argentina's participation in international groups.

b) The national effort should be oriented towards a general north-south direction, completing first the integration of the northern region, later that of the entire continental territory of the Malvinas and the Argentine Sea, and finally the islands of the South Atlantic and the Antarctic."

It is clear that the system is correct, although it may be debatable. The central area, which is considered to be integrated already in relative terms, is made up of the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Cordoba and Entre Rios.

Entre Rios is part of the highway network thanks to the Hernandarias Tunnel, which runs under the river to connect Santa Fe and Parana, the two provincial capitals, and thus adds to the value of the Mesopotamian area and brings it into the free circulation of wealth and the central development of the country.

The bridges over the Uruguay River are manifestations not only of a national desire to coordinate, but also of a vision of International Policy. The construction first of the General Artigas Bridge, which joins Colon with Paysandu, and then of the Puente Libertador General San Martin, which joins Puerto Unzue with Fray Bentos, was coordinated with the binational Salto Grande Dam, which will carry on its back a third highway and railroad bridge at Concordia.

Strategic discussions are out of fashion: the bridges rise splendidly over the Uruguay. The Zarate-Brazo Largo Complex on the Parana Delta joins the province of Buenos Aires with that of Entre Rios.

The complex involves a project which will allow the crossing of the two large arms of the Parana River: Parana de las Palmas and Parana Guazu. They are communicated by a 30-kilometer highway between the two crossings, across Talavera Island. Each of the main bridges is 550 meters long, and has highway and railway traffic on the same level. The roadways are located outside the bridge towers. The Zarate-Brazo Largo bridges are considered to be unique in the world. Going across the Parana at 50 meters above the river is a real pleasure. The completed project is an imposing sight.

The uncertainty arises because the monumental complex, which was begun in 1970, is to be linked with Gualedaychu so that it can be connected to the Argentine coast, but that part is still under construction. The building of the route is 18 months behind schedule. It is to cross the south of Entre Rios and link the 200,000 square kilometers of the Mesopotamia, through 120 kilometers of gravel, potholes and dirt, to the most densely populated region of the country. At least, that is what it is supposed to do. Eighty-five kilometers from the Federal Capital, Zarate, where the complex begins, marks

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the end of all grandeur, after 40 kilometers.

Uruguay, in the context of the Rio de la Plata Basin, is the country with the most natural affinity with Argentina. The value of the Mesopotamian area arises from the importance of the projects under construction and on the drawing board. The unfinished highway produces an image of incoherence which is not understood on an international level.

Coordination has never been the strong point of Argentines. But the international bridge joining Fray Bentos (Uruguay) with Puerto Unzué (Entre Ríos) is a heavily frequented means of access to the country where commercial ties are more and more strengthened on both sides. The stretch under construction, whose delay can no longer be attributed to geopolitical factors, is for now a simple example of incoherence.

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CUBA

'GRANMA' ANALYZES PRC'S ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S., VIETNAM

Havana PRELA in Spanish 1541 GMT 27 Mar 79 PA

[Text] Havana, 27 Mar (PL)--The newspaper GRANMA reports today that China avoided a confrontation with the "paper tiger" (the United States) during the U.S. aggression against Vietnam.

The morning newspaper recalls that during many bombing missions in Vietnam, U.S. Air Force planes penetrated Chinese territory. It adds that in many of these cases the Chinese leaders simply issued "serious warnings" to Washington. Some 450 such warnings were issued up to 1971.

The report appears in the "Sin Punto y Aparte" column. It is the fifth installment of a series published under the heading of "China and the Paper Tiger."

In the opinion of the Cuban newspaper, the U.S. war of aggression against Vietnam clearly revealed where the sympathy and interest of the Chinese leaders lay. Even though they did give some material assistance to Vietnam and proclaimed their solidarity with Vietnam's struggle in their propaganda, they also took pains not to displease the United States.

Statements made by Mao Zedong to U.S. newsman Edgar Snow gave the green light to the United States to escalate its aggression against Vietnam, the newspaper recalls.

In this regard, it quotes Mao as telling Snow in January 1965 that "war could only break out if the United States entered China." The Chinese will only fight if the United States attacks China, Mao told the U.S. newsman, who was widely known in government circles in Washington.

With the absolute certainty that the internationalism proclaimed by the Chinese leaders was a big hoax, the newspaper says, Lyndon Johnson ordered a resumption of the large-scale bombing of Vietnam.

It affirms that Mao's statement and what he possibly confided to Snow, not for publication but for relay to U.S. Government leaders, led to the

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launching of a campaign in the United States to promote rapprochement with the PRC.

Weeks after Mao's interview with Snow, GRANMA recalls, approximately 1,000 members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce approved a resolution urging the government "to explore paths leading to a more effective opening of channels of communications" between the United States and the PRC.

GRANMA says that in 1965 the "NEW YORK TIMES" corroborated the PRC's betrayal of Vietnam and the revolutionary world by stating that "Communist China has more important concerns than its concern over its comrades in Hanoi and the Vietcong." As history has demonstrated, this concern centered around teaming up with the United States. The dream began to come true when Richard Nixon shook hands with Mao Zedong in Beijing in February 1972, GRANMA says.

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CUBA

SUCCESS OF NONALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA TERMED CERTAIN

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 19 Mar-1 Apr 79 p 67

[Text] "The coming summit of nonaligned countries in Havana amounts to a message of hope for the peoples of Latin America. This observation was made by Samora Machel, president of Mozambique, as he opened a special meeting of the nonaligned movement's coordination bureau. The meeting was held 2 months ago in Maputo. "Cuba," he added, "is a small country insofar as the amount of territory it has, but a great country in light of its history and the determination of its people." The fact that it is the first Latin American country to welcome the chiefs of state and government of the countries that comprise the nonaligned movement is an "important anti-imperialist victory" according to Machel.

Coming from a source as authoritative as the Mozambique chief of state, these words are an indictment of the entire series of side stepping maneuvers that has been carried out over the last few months by a number of pro-imperialist countries in the Third World (Sadat's in particular) that are aimed at draining the movement of its substance or, failing that, of dividing the nonaligned movement. The Cuban engagement in Africa provided the pretext, and the holding of the summit in Havana has provided the long awaited opportunity.

The purpose of the maneuvering was to draw a number of Third World governments into opposition to holding the sixth summit in the Cuban capital. During the meeting of the coordination bureau in Belgrade last July there were clear diplomatic maneuvers in this direction. However all indications are that the efforts went for naught. The Maputo meeting played a decisive role in the outcome.

A Common Language

Attempts to divide the nonaligned movement are not new. At the fourth summit, which met in Algiers in September 1973, the Chinese thesis of "two imperialisms," adopted by some feudal and pro-American governments, was openly directed against Cuba. The intent was to give credence to the thesis that an alliance with the Soviet Union would be incompatible with nonalignment.

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It can now be seen, particularly in light of recent developments in Chinese foreign policy (alliance with the United States, invasion of Vietnam), what would have happened to nonalignment if Peking's maneuvers had found receptive ground.

The *raison d'être* for nonalignment, emphasized the Mozambique daily NOTICIAS DE BEIRA, is "the refutation of imperialism and colonialism." Participating in the nonaligned movement "does not mean adopting a neutral attitude toward political issues," the daily added. This view reflects the consensus that was reached at the Maputo meeting.

The people who are fighting against apartheid and colonialism in south Africa and those who are under the heel of counter revolutionary terrorist regimes in Latin America wouldn't understand any other language. Until now the Latin American presence in the nonaligned movement has been rather circumspect. It isn't likely that this situation will change qualitatively, that the majority of the Latin American countries will take their place in the Third World's struggle for a new international order, as long as the Pinochets, the Videlas, the Somozas, and their types remain in power.

In this respect it is a very symbolic fact that, at a time when the democratic and anti-imperialist movement is regaining the offensive from one end of the Latin American continent to the other, Havana has been chosen to host the Third World's most important event.

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